Abstract-Large-scale cascading failures can be triggered by very few initial failures, leading to severe damages in complex networks. This paper studies load-dependent cascading failures in random networks consisting of a large but finite number of components. Under a random single-node attack, a framework is developed to quantify the damage at each stage of a cascade. Estimations and analyses for the fraction of failed nodes are presented to evaluate the time-dependent system damage due to the attack. The results provide guidelines for choosing the load margin to avoid a cascade of failures. Furthermore, the analysis reveals a phase transition behavior in the extent of the damage as the load margin grows, i.e., the fraction of the damaged components drops from near one to near zero over a slight change in the load margin. The critical value of the load margin and the short interval over which such an abrupt change occurs are derived to characterize the network reaction to small network load variations. Our findings provide design principles for enhancing the network resiliency in load-dependent complex networks with practical sizes.
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INTRODUCTION
A S modern society becomes more and more networked, there is an increasing requirement of security and reliability in complex networks such as telecommunication systems and the Internet. A wide-spread cascading failure is a serious threat to such systems [2] , [3] . Starting with a small disturbance, cascading failures may lead to a complete or major network collapse. Despite an extensive effort to study the properties of cascading failures in complex networks, this field is still under-explored, especially for the cases of finite-size networks. Thus, it is crucial to investigate the properties of cascading failures for such cases to improve the operation security and reliability.
In many real-life networks such as transportation networks and communication networks, each node bears some load, which can be redistributed locally to its neighbors. The loads of the nodes can be a particular material or abstract information [4] . In normal conditions, each node maintains a load below its capacity. When some initial failures occur (due to attacks or internal failures), the failed nodes are removed, and their loads will be redistributed to their neighbors. If the neighbors then become overloaded, they will fail too, and their loads will be redistributed further. Such a process may lead to a cascading failure.
Many researchers have studied this area from different aspects and found valuable results. From a graph model perspective [5] , Motter and Lai [6] , and Crucitti et al. [7] , [8] both adopted betweenness [7] , [9] to model the load on a component. In [6] , Motter and Lai found that heterogeneous topologies are more vulnerable to attacks. In [7] and [8] , the authors used Erd€ os-R enyi random graphs to study the networks where the load of each node is proportional to its betweenness. They showed that in such models an intended attack on the most heavily loaded node can collapse the entire network. Load-dependent cascades have been studied in [10] , [11] , [12] . In [10] , the authors considered a network of identical nodes and applied a Poisson branching process to study cascading failures. In [11] and [12] , Wang and Rong assumed that both initially-assigned load and redistributed load are proportional to the node's degree. They concluded that in such a setting, an attack on the most heavily loaded node might not always be the most destructive one. The majority of the existing analytical work focuses on cascading failures in asymptotically large networks. However, finite-size networks are of paramount importance in both theoretical analysis and real life. For such networks, the analytical approach has been mostly overlooked (mainly due to technical difficulties), limiting the results to only simulations [7] , [8] .
In this paper, we develop a framework to study cascading failures in a network represented by a finite-size Erd€ os-R enyi (ER) random graph [13] , [14] . In such a network, each node carries a certain amount of load, and maintains a load margin up to which it can tolerate some extra load. If a node becomes overloaded, it fails and its load is redistributed to its neighbors. We adopt the ER random graph as the topology model since such model is homogeneous by construction, and it has the advantage of being mathematically tractable given many important properties [15] . While the ER random graph itself is a basic model, many of its variants with non-Poisson distributions are used to model some real-world networks, such as the Internet and collaboration graphs [15] , [16] . A thorough understanding of such complicated networks requires a strong knowledge of the fundamental ER model. Furthermore, we focus on random single-node attacks and study the propagation of failures. We assume that the initial load at each node is proportional to its degree, which is also a fraction of its capacity, leaving some load margin. Inspired by the nature of load shifting in many real networks such as the transportation network [6] , [8] , [17] , the load redistribution upon failure is assumed to be in proportion to the neighbors' capacities. This paper proposes several novel approaches to quantitatively analyze such cascade model. For example, we partition the overall node set into several subsets according to their potential failing time. In the proposed framework, the main contributions of this paper are:
Step-by-step analysis of damages at each stage of a potential cascade: To quantify the severity of a cascade, we use the fraction of failed nodes, which we denote as failure ratio. We provide a method to calculate the failure ratio at each step of the potential cascade. We also estimate the time when the cascade reaches a steady state. Our results provide insights into choosing the right value of the load margin such that a cascade of failures can be avoided. Threshold behavior of the collateral damage: Numerical results show that the failure ratio drops from near 1 to near 0 over a very short interval of the load margin. We find the interval within which such phase transition occurs and derive the critical value of the load margin at which the abrupt change of the failure ratio takes place. The phase transition interval along with the critical value of the load margin characterizes the network reaction to a random singlenode attack. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the system model and defines the notations. A step-by-step analysis of the average failure ratio is provided in Section 3. The phase transition in the average failure ratio is explored in Section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
LOAD-BASED CASCADE MODEL
In this section, we describe our model of the load-based cascading failure. We also discuss the topology and attack models. Table 1 lists all the notations used in this paper.
Topology Model
Consider an ER random graph Gðn; pÞ, where the graph has n nodes and every two nodes are connected with probability p independent of the other pairs [14] . The overall node set is denoted as V . During each step t of a cascade (rigorously defined later), some nodes are failed (dead), and some are still functioning (alive). For any node v 2 V , we use N t ðvÞ to denote the set of functioning neighbors of v at the beginning of step t. Particularly, N 0 ðvÞ represents the initial neighbor set of v before any failures. The degree of node v, denoted by kðvÞ, is the number of initial neighbors of v, i.e., kðvÞ ¼ jN 0 ðvÞj, where j Á j is the cardinality of a set.
Each node v has a load L t ðvÞ at the beginning of step t. We assume that the initial load of each node is proportional to its degree [11] , [18] . To simplify the analysis, we set the proportion scaling factor as 1, such that L 0 ðvÞ ¼ kðvÞ. Each node v has a time-invariant capacity CðvÞ, which is the maximum load that it can handle. Furthermore, CðvÞ is assumed to be proportional to L 0 ðvÞ, i.e., CðvÞ ¼ aL 0 ðvÞ ¼ akðvÞ;
where a ! 1 is the tolerance parameter (load margin) of the network, the same across all the nodes. A node will fail if the load exceeds its capacity.
Attack and Contagion Models
In this paper, we focus on the case of a random single-node attack, where the initially attacked node is a single randomly chosen node in the network. After the initial attack, we divide the overall cascade process into time slots called steps. During each step, the latest failed nodes redistribute their loads to their functioning neighbors. If any of the neighbors fail, they will redistribute their loads at the next step. The load redistribution mechanism is described as follows. Assume that node a is attacked initially (during step t ¼ 0) and fails. Then at step t ¼ 1, the neighbors of a, i.e., nodes in N 1 ðaÞ, will receive some redistributed load, with node a and its adjacent links being removed from the network. Given a node u 2 N 1 ðaÞ, DL 1 ða; uÞ denotes the redistributed load received by node u from node a at step 1, where DL 1 ða; uÞ is proportional to the capacity of u, and is given as 
Conditional variance of kðV
Critical value of a at step t ½a l;t ; a h;t Threshold interval of a at step t The load of u at the beginning of step 2 can be obtained as L 2 ðuÞ ¼ L 1 ðuÞ þ DL 1 ða; uÞ. This redistribution rule makes sense since nodes with larger capacities bear larger absolute load margins. After redistributing the load of a, some nodes in N 1 ðaÞ may fail and be removed from the network, and redistribute their total loads to their functioning neighbors at step t ¼ 2 in a similar fashion. We define the steady state as the step when the failure propagation stops in the network. Let F t , t ! 1, denote the set of nodes fail during the step t. The set of accumulated failed nodes by the end of step t is denoted by T t , where
We define the failure ratio f t at step t as jT t j divided by the network size n, i.e., f t ¼ jT t j=n, such that f t 2 ½0; 1. This paper uses the average value of the failure ratio taken over all random realizations of the ER graph and all random single-node attacks to quantify the extent of the damage caused by a singlenode attack.
We define the collective degree for a set W V as the summation of the degrees of the nodes in W , given by kðW Þ , P v2W kðvÞ. Similarly, the aggregate capacity and load of set W at step t are defined as CðW Þ , P v2W CðvÞ and L t ðW Þ , P v2W L t ðvÞ, respectively. The load redistributed at step t from a set W to a disjoint set U is denoted by DL t ðW; UÞ , P 8v2W;8u2U DL t ðv; uÞ. The neighbor set union of set W at step t is given by N t ðW Þ , ð[ v2W N t ðvÞÞ n W . An example of the neighboring set and the load redistribution between two sets are illustrated by Fig. 1 . Utilizing these notations, we can formally present the load redistribution rule at an arbitrary step t as follows. 
Partition of Nodes
To visualize the step-by-step cascade of failures, this paper proposes a partition which can be applied to the overall node set V . According to the partition, set V is divided into a sequence of distinct subsets V 0 ; V 1 ; V 2 ; . . ., where V 0 ¼ fag is the initially attacked node. For d ! 1; V d denotes the set of nodes whose shortest distance (number of hops) to a is d, measured over the initial topology. Note that the minimum number of steps that it takes a cascade to reach to V d is d. In Fig. 2 , we demonstrate such a partition, from which the following relationship can be observed between V d , d ! 0, and their original neighbor sets,
These are important properties to be utilized in our analysis. Obtaining E½jV d j, the average size of V d , will simplify the analysis in Section 3. The following lemma gives an approximation of E½jV d j; d ! 1, for random single-node attacks in ER random graph.
Lemma 1. Consider a random single-node attack applied to
Gðn; pÞ. Let node a be the attacked node, and node e be an arbitrary node in V nfag. Let P d be the probability that the shortest path from e to a has length d; PrfB d g be the probability that at least one path from e directly through a node in V nfa [ eg to a has a length which is less than or equal to d. Then
where P d ; d ! 1, can be obtained recursively as
In the numerical calculation, we assume that PrfB d g; d > 2, can be approximated recursively as
The proof of Lemma 1, including the discussion of the approximation, is provided in the appendix, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http:// doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/10.1109/TNSE.2017.2685582. To see the accuracy of the results in Lemma 1, some simulations were conducted with different values of n and p. It can be found that Lemma 1 always yields accurate approximations of E½jV d j. One example is shown in Fig. 3 , in which the theoretic estimates were obtained from Lemma 1, and the simulation results were averaged from 8,000 random realizations of Gð150; 0:05Þ. We can see that the two curves are almost overlapping, such that the approximations given in Lemma 1 are highly accurate.
ESTIMATION OF THE AVERAGE FAILURE RATIO
Recall that the failure ratio f t at step t is defined as the total casualties jT t j divided by the network size n, i.e., f t ¼ jT t j=n. We use failure ratio to quantify the damage caused by the attack. However, since both the topology (ER random graph) and the location of the initial attack are random, the 
failure ratio would be a random variable. Thus, we focus on the average value of this random variable taken over all realizations of the random topologies and random singlenode attacks. In this section, we first state a few properties that will be utilized in the analysis, and then provide a stepby-step estimate of the average failure ratio. At the end, we verify the accuracy of our estimations via simulations.
Properties of Load-Based Cascade Model
Here are a few preliminary results useful to quantify the average failure ratio. The following lemma and corollary address the first step of load redistribution after the attack. They are particularly useful in early assessment of the attack impacts.
Lemma 2. Consider an attack on an arbitrary node a in the network Gðn; pÞ. Also, consider the partition in Section 2.3 applied to the network. After the load redistribution at step 1, the nodes in V 1 either all fail or all survive.
Proof. When node a fails, each node u 2 V 1 receives some additional load given by (3) . The initial load of u and its capacity are given as kðuÞ and akðuÞ, respectively (see (1) and the explanation above it). Dividing the total load of u after the redistribution by its capacity, we have
which is the same for all nodes in V 1 . Therefore, at the first step either all nodes in V 1 fail (i.e., 
holds, all the nodes in V 1 fail at step t ¼ 1, i.e., F 1 ¼ V 1 . Otherwise, there are no failures occurring at step t ¼ 1 or later. In particular, when a ! 2, the degree constraint of (6) cannot be satisfied and there would be no cascade of failures.
Proof. According to the proof of Lemma 2, for each node u 2 V 1 , the ratio of its load to its capacity by the end of step 1 is given as kðV 1 Þ þ kðaÞ akðV 1 Þ , which is the same for all the nodes in V 1 . Thus, all the nodes in V 1 become overloaded only if this ratio is greater than 1, i.e., kðaÞ þ kðV 1 Þ > akðV 1 Þ. However, the condition kðV 1 Þ < kðaÞ aÀ1 cannot be satisfied when a ! 2 since the aggregate degree of the set V 1 , i.e., kðV 1 Þ, is always greater than or equal to the degree of the node a, kðaÞ. t u Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 are direct consequences of our assumptions that the capacity of a node is proportional to its initial load and the load of a failed node is redistributed to its neighbors according to their capacity. There are two important remarks as follows. Remark 2. If a 1, there is no tolerance for any extra load from the initially attacked node, and all the nodes will fail as a result of the attack. On the other hand, if a ! 2, Corollary 1 suggests that the failure would not go beyond the attacked node, resulting in f t ¼ 1=n for t ! 1. Hence, there is no uncertainty about the network reaction to a random single-node attack when a 1 or a ! 2. In the rest of the paper, we will focus on the network reaction with a 2 ð1; 2Þ.
Step 1 of Cascade
In the sequel, we present a step-by-step estimate of the average failure ratio that is obtained recursively. The following theorem gives such an estimate after the first step of load redistribution, which will be used to later derive the failure ratio at future steps.
Theorem 1. Consider a random single-node attack applied to
Gðn; pÞ. We assume the conditional distribution of kðV 1 Þ given jV 1 j ¼ x is approximately normal with mean m and variance s 2 , where
Then E½f 1 , i.e., the average failure ratio at step 1, can be approximated as
! is the binomial coefficient, and FðÁÞ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the standard normal distribution.
The proof of Theorem 1, including the justification of the assumption used in Theorem 1, is provided in the appendix, available in the online supplemental material.
Future Steps of Cascade
The following theorem provides an estimate for the average failure ratio after the first step, whose proof can be found in Fig. 3 .
Theorem 2. Consider a random single-node attack applied to
Gðn; pÞ. We assume,
(1) We only consider the failures propagating in the forward direction; i.e., at step t, only the nodes in V n [ tÀ1 d¼0 V d are considered as potential nodes to fail. (2) The set F tÀ1 is considered as a large virtual node that redistributes its load to its alive neighbors at step t with the rule defined in (3)
Then an estimate of the average failure ratio E½f t for step t ! 2 is obtained recursively as
where Theorem 2 provides a recursive method to obtain an estimate of the average failure ratio for all the steps after step 1. Approximations are made to derive the above theorem. One of the approximations, the forward-propagation approximation, will be discussed in the following section. Cascade after step 1 is a very complicated process, which involves a large number of random variables. Obtaining an exact closed-form solution is mathematically difficult and computationally complex. In contrast, this theorem takes a computationally manageable expression and provides good accuracy in the same time, which is a simple yet effective approach towards calculating the damage due to a cascade.
Forward-Propagation Approximation
In the previous analysis, we proposed a step-by-step approximation of the average failure ratio in a cascade event. For mathematical tractability, the approximation only counts the failures propagating in the forward direction, which we denote by "forward propagation". In other words, at each step t of the cascade, we only consider failures caused by V tÀ1 in V t . This excludes any failures due to the load redistribution within V tÀ1 , and any failures in V tÀ2 caused by V tÀ1 (here denoted as "backward propagation"). Let us explain why the impact of backward propagation is negligible. Recall that Lemma 2 states that, the nodes in V 1 either all fail or all survive at the first step. Our analysis along with numerical results asserts that this fact almost holds for the future steps as well. That is, at each step t, either "almost" all the nodes in V t die or "almost" all of them survive. Our analysis in Section 4.1 (Theorem 4) shows that if V 1 fails for a given a, then the chance of V 2 ; V 3 ; . . . failing in the forward failure propagation is quite high, leaving almost no nodes to be failed in the backward propagation. This also results in a threshold behavior in the average failure ratio with respect to the load margin. That is, the average failure ratio stays close to either 0 or 1 for almost every value of the load margin while changing from near 1 to near 0 over a very short interval of the load margin. This phase transition is further illustrated by our numerical results in the next section and is scrutinized in Section 4.
Numerical Validation
In the derivation of the step-by-step estimates for E½f t , several approximations were applied to keep the results tractable. To verify the accuracy of our estimations, a comparison of the estimated average failure ratios given by Theorems 1 and 2 against the simulation results is shown in Fig. 4 . Two topologies, Gð100; 0:05Þ and Gð400; 0:01Þ, have been adopted to compute the average failure ratios caused by random single-node attacks. In the simulation results, the empirical average failure ratios were calculated via 8,000 ER random graph realizations, and 500 experiments with random single-node attacks in each topology, following the load-based failure propagation model defined in Section 2. Fig. 4 shows the comparisons at multiple steps of the cascade. The results make it clear that despite several simplifying approximations, our estimates follow the true (simulated) values very closely. We examined networks of different sizes, and found that the approximation accuracy is acceptable as long as n is reasonably large, e.g., n ! 20. As seen in Fig. 4 , a random single-node attack may still cause serious damages to the network, particularly when a (load margin) is relatively small. Another important observation is the quick drop in the size of such damages as the load margin grows. Such a phase transition phenomenon will be explored in Section 4.
As an illustration of the real-world networks, some simulations were conducted in a Facebook network [19] with n ¼ 233 total nodes and kðV Þ ¼ 6; 384 total degrees. The step-by-step comparison between the average failure ratios in the Facebook network and in ER random graph under random single-node attacks is shown in Fig. 5 . The ER random graph was generated with the same size n and connecting probability (p ¼ 6; 384=n=ðn À 1Þ ¼ 0:129) as the Facebook network. In Fig. 5 , the simulation results in the Facebook network were obtained from 2,000 experiments with random single-node attacks in the given network, while the simulation results in ER random graph were obtained from 2,000 realizations of ER random graph, and 200 experiments with random single-node attacks in each topology.
Furthermore, a comparison between the theoretic estimations of the average failure ratios and the simulation results in the Facebook network, both at steady state, under different a values is shown in Fig. 6 . The estimated values were calculated by Theorems 1 and 2 with setting n ¼ 233; p ¼ 0:129. The simulation results were obtained similarly with Fig. 5 and the values were recorded at the steady state. Although the Facebook network's power law degree distribution is different from the ER random graph's binomial degree distribution, our model still provides a close trace of the average failure ratio. This example indicates that our model not only makes an important contribution to generic complex network analysis, but also can provide a basis reference for realworld networks. This is because that our model captures the impact of a network's average degree, which plays an important role in a cascade of failures.
Discussion of Other Attack Methods
In the previous section, we have shown that the simulation results in ER random graph under random single-node Fig. 4 . Comparison between the estimated average failure ratios and the simulation results in Gð100; 0:05Þ and Gð400; 0:01Þ under random singlenode attacks. Estimates for step 1 were given by Theorem 1, and estimates for steps 2, 4 and 9 were given by Theorem 2. attacks, which validated the analysis. Here we present a brief discussion on other attack methods, including random multiple-node attack and targeted attack on the node with the largest degree, to gain more insight of the proposed model and the analytical results. A comparison between the above two attack methods and random single-node attack is shown in Fig. 7 . Two different a values were tested: a ¼ 1:15 and a ¼ 1:2. The simulation results were obtained from 2,000 realizations of ER graph Gð100; 0:05Þ, and 200 experiments with random single-node attacks in each topology.
According to Fig. 7 , the average failure ratios on the steady state are different under three attack methods. A random five-node attack is always more devastating than a random single-node attack under both two a values. A targeted attack on the node with the largest degree is more destructive than a random single-node attack when a ¼ 1:15. In contrast, when a ¼ 1:2, a random single-node attack leads to more failures than a targeted attack on the node with the largest degree. This is because that V 1 becomes overloaded almost surely with a ! 1. Thus, when a node with a larger degree is attacked, more failures will be triggered. However, when a becomes larger, the random single-node attack brings more failures. This is the result of Lemma 2, whereby failure condition (6) is less likely to be satisfied when the initial-attacked node has a larger degree with a large a. Besides, it is shown that the failure propagation under these three attack methods reaches to steady state at the almost same time. Therefore, our analysis results can be applied as an estimate of steady state for these two attack methods.
PHASE TRANSITION OVER a
As we mentioned earlier, the average failure ratio decreases from near 1 to 1=n as a varies over the interval ð1; 2Þ. Simulation results in Fig. 4 , however, indicate a rapid phase transition over a much smaller interval, denoted in this paper by the threshold interval. In this section, we study this interval to further characterize the network reaction to random single-node attacks. We first find a critical point in this interval at which the failure ratio becomes very sensitive to the changes in a. We then derive the lower and upper bounds of the interval.
Critical Value of a
For each E½f t ; t ! 1, we define a critical value of a at which E½f t takes the median value of its variable range. As seen in Fig. 4 , E½f t undergoes rapid changes in the close vicinity of such a critical value. Since
where Prfv fails j v 2 [ t d¼1 V d g has a range ½0; 1, the variable range of E½f t is
According to (7) , the critical value of a could be found when Prfv fails j v 2 [
Let a c;t denote the critical a at step t, which is formally defined as
We start our analysis by finding a c;1 , i.e., the critical a for E½f 1 . In the following, we drop the index t for a c;t , a l;t and a h;t , wherever it is clear from the text. The proof of Theorem 3, including the justification of the assumption is provided in the appendix, available in the online supplemental material.
Theorem 3. Consider a random single-node attack applied to
Gðn; pÞ. Under the same assumption of Theorem 1. The critical value of a for the first step, i.e., a c;1 , can be obtained by
Before deriving a c;t for t ! 2, consider Fig. 8 , which shows the average failure ratio over Gð100; 0:05Þ via simulations. The four curves shown are recorded at steps 1, 2, 3, and 9 of the cascade. These curves suggest that the variations of a c;t over different steps are very small. In fact, in Gð100; 0:05Þ, a c;t for t ! 1 can be numerically obtained as 1:17 AE 0:05. The following set of analytical results shed light on the fact that the critical a stays almost the same across different steps, suggesting that a c;1 may very well be used to approximate a c;t , t ! 2. Step-by-step comparison of the average failure ratios under three attack methods in Gð100; 0:05Þ. Under a targeted single-node attack, the node with largest degree is attacked. A random five-node attack is always more devastating than a random single-node attack. A targeted singlenode attack leads to more failures than a random single-node attack with a ¼ 1:15 but fewer failures than a random single-node attack with a ¼ 1:2.
Lemma 3. Consider a random single-node attack applied to Gðn; pÞ. At any arbitrary step, the failure probability of any node or set of nodes is a non-increasing function of a.
Proof. This lemma is intuitive. If node e fails with a ¼ a Ã , it also fails if a 2 ð1; a Ã Þ. The same is true for the failures of sets of nodes. Corollary 2 can be proven similarly. Gðn; pÞ with a 2 ð1; 1 ðnÀ2Þp þ 1, and define a family of events: X t ="V t fails at step t", t ! 1. We assume that the set F tÀ1 can be considered as a large virtual node that redistributes its load to its alive neighbors at step t. Then the conditional probabilities of failure satisfy PrfX t j X tÀ1 g ! PrfX 1 g; 8t > 1.
The proof of Theorem 4, including the justifications of the assumptions used, is provided in the appendix, available in the online supplemental material. First note that Lemma 3 along with Theorem 3 indicates that PrfV 1 fails at step 1g 0:5 when a > a c;1 % 1 1þðnÀ2Þp þ 1. Since any further failures are conditioned on the failure of V 1 in the first step, the failure probability of any node at any step will be smaller than or equal to PrfV 1 fails at step 1g 0:5 when a > a c;1
This along with the definition of a c;t implies that a c;t for every step t ! 2 is within the small range ð1; a c;1 Þ. Note that p ¼ ln n=n is the threshold for connectedness of Gðn; pÞ [20] . Therefore, in a connected Gðn; pÞ, we have np ! ln n, which is greater than or equal to 3.22 in typicalsize networks of 25 nodes or larger. This leads to a c;1 is approximate less or equal than 1.24 for connected networks that are of interest in this paper. On the other hand, we can see from Fig. 8 that there exists an a l > 1 (to be calculated in Section 4.2) such that PrfV 1 fails at step 1g % 1 for a 2 ð1; a l . By applying Theorem 4 and the chain rule of probability, we obtain Prf[ t % 1 for a 2 ð1; a l . Therefore, a c;t sits within a very narrow range of ða l ; a c;1 Þ, enabling us to approximate a c;t ; t ! 2 by a c;1 given in Theorem 3.
Numerical results are shown in Table 2 to quantify the accuracy of approximating a c;t ; t ! 2 by a c;1 . Relative approximation errors are provided for various steps of cascade over four different topologies: Gð100; 0:03Þ, Gð100; 0:05Þ, Gð200; 0:03Þ and Gð400; 0:01Þ. Under each topology, a c;t ; t ¼ 1; . . . ; 9, are first manually obtained from simulations according to the definition of a c;t , and then compared against a c;1 given by Theorem 3. As we see, the approximation error in each case is less than 1 percent, suggesting that the simple expression for a c;1 given by Theorem 3 can be applied to approximate the critical value of the tolerance parameter for almost every step.
Because that the close-form expression of a c;1 given by Theorem 3 is simple and only depend on np and p, not depend on n. This result can even be applied to the asymptotic case: n ! 1; np ! . In such case, we have p ! 0 and a c ! 1 þ 1=ð1 þ Þ. This knowledge of a c can be utilized as a fast prediction of the a region where the cascading failures happen in a network. As we discussed at the beginning of this section, E½f t drops significantly from its maximum value to near zero within a small interval, referred to as the threshold interval. Based on the relationship between E½f t and Prfv fails j v 2 [ (7), this is the interval where Prfv fails j v 2 [ t d¼1 V d g drops from near 1 to 1=n. We denote the threshold interval at step t by ½a l;t ; a h;t . With a l;t and a h;t , the domain of a at step t is divided into three parts: ð1; a l;t Þ; ½a l;t ; a h;t and ða h;t ; 2Þ. In particular, Prfv fails j v 2 [ t d¼1 V d g stays very close to 1 for a 2 ð1; a l;t Þ, drops quickly for a 2 ½a l;t ; a h;t , and stays close to 0 for a 2 ða h;t ; 2Þ. In this section, we provide approximations for a l;t and a h;t and verify their accuracy via simulations.
As a well-studied result, the normal random variable takes 95 and 99 percent of its values within two and three standard deviations of its mean, respectively. This fact is known as the empirical rule. Accordingly, we present two criteria for the threshold interval, namely 2s and 3s intervals, within which Prfv fails j v 2 [ t d¼1 V d g loses 95 and 99 percent of its maximum values, respectively. We start by presenting our method to approximate the threshold interval for the first step of a cascade. The proof of Theorem 5, including the justifications of the assumptions, is provided in the appendix, available in the online supplemental material.
Theorem 5. Consider a random single-node attack applied to Gðn; pÞ. Under the same assumption of Theorem 1. We also assume a h;1 and a l;1 are estimated given jV 1 j ¼ ðn À 1Þp. The threshold interval ½a l;1 ; a h;1 for the first step of the cascade can be obtained as follows:
where c ¼ 2 and c ¼ 3 lead to the 2s and 3s threshold intervals, respectively. Within the 2s and 3s threshold intervals, E½f 1 drops 95 and 99 percent of its maximum value, respectively.
In Section 4.1, we showed how a c;t ; t ! 2 is well approximated by a c;1 . Similarly, we justify here how a l;1 and a h;1 above serve as good approximations of a l;t and a h;t , t ! 2. Since all future failures are conditioned on the failure of the first step, we have Prfv fails j v 2 [ t d¼1 V d g PrfV 1 fails at step1g, 8a 2 ð1; 2Þ. Therefore, the definition of threshold interval yields a l;t a l;1 ; a h;t a h;1 :
However, applying Theorem 4 and the chain rule of probability to the interval a 2 ð1; a l;1 , we have
V d failg ! ðPrfV 1 fails at step 1gÞ t ; a 2 ð1; a l;1 : (11) Fig. 9 . Verification of a c and threshold intervals for Gð100; 0:03Þ; Gð100; 0:05Þ; Gð200; 0:03Þ; Gð400; 0:01Þ; E½f 1 ; E½f 2 ; E½f 3 ; E½f 4 ; E½f steady state were obtained from cascading failure simulations; a c and 2s interval, 3s interval were given by Theorem 3 and Theorem 5.
Since PrfV 1 fails at step 1g % 1 when a 2 ð1; a l;1 , we obtain
From (10) and (12) we conclude that a l;t % a l;1 , 8t ! 2. On the other hand, we know that a h;t 2 ða c;t ; a h;1 , which is very narrow. Therefore, a h;1 provides a tight upper bound for a h;t , which is often appreciated when designing a robust network. Here, we simply approximate a h;t by a h;1 given in Theorem 5. We now verify the accuracy of our findings for a c and ½a l ; a h by considering cascading failures over four different topologies: Gð100; 0:03Þ, Gð100; 0:05Þ, Gð200; 0:03Þ and Gð400; 0:01Þ. The exact values obtained by simulations are depicted in Fig. 9 , along with the analytical approximates given by Theorems 3 and 5. Simulation results were obtained in the same method with Fig. 4 . As it can be seen, a c and ½a l ; a h obtained from Theorems 3 and 5 accurately characterize the phase transition in the average failure ratio due to a random single-node attack. This knowledge of threshold interval can be utilized to avoid risky or redundant investment when the tolerance parameter is set to operate the network.
CONCLUSION
We introduced a load-based cascade model to study the vulnerability of complex networks under random singlenode attacks, where the ER random graph with finite size was used to represent the network. We assumed that the capacity of a node is proportional to its initial load and the load of a failed node is redistributed to its neighbors according to their capacity. The average failure ratio at each step was used to quantify the damage experienced by the network. A step-by-step estimation of the average failure ratio has been provided. The accuracy of such estimations was validated by numerical results. Our analysis for finite-size networks revealed a phase transition phenomenon in network reactions to single-node attacks, where the average value of the failure ratio drops quickly within a short interval of the load margin. We characterized this interval by finding the critical value of the tolerance parameter at which the failure ratio takes its median value and is most sensitive to the variation of the tolerance parameter. We also derived the threshold interval within which this phase transition occurs. Our findings shed light on how to set the load margin for both robustness and efficient use of resources in designing networks resilient to random single-node attacks. He is a member of the IEEE Communications and Computer Societies, and has served as a reviewer for numerous IEEE journals. He has also served on several NSF review panels, and as session chair in several IEEE conferences and workshops. His current research interests include nanocommunications, applications of coding theory in biology, resilient design of cyber-physical systems, fault-tolerant quantum computing, and bigdata storage systems. He is a member of the IEEE.
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